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 Ethical aspects of prenatal genetic diagnostics  
Hille Haker 
Center for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities - University of Tübingen 
  
Introduction 
In this essay I will consider genetic diagnostics, especially pre-natal 
diagnostics, with a brief reference to pre-implantation genetic techniques. I 
will focus on a moral discussion of the subject and will try to clarify a 
number of aspects. However I will not give a definitive and indisputable 
answer to the normative questions which have been raised by new 
technical possibilities. To this regard everyone should consider themselves 
invited to an open debate, a debate that has as yet been on the whole 
conducted badly and that cannot be brought to a hasty conclusion by 
drawing on outdated beliefs. 
Self-fulfilment ethics and normative ethics 
In the past years the difference in terminology between the two 
fundamental aspects of ethics has been framed in many different 
perspectives. When we distinguish between everyday ethics on one hand 
and theoretical reflection on ethics on the other, we can use the concepts 
of "values" and "norms" for the former, and the concepts of "ethics of self-
fulfilment" and of "normative ethics" for the latter. Unfortunately, in the 
German-speaking world authors have not yet reached a clear consensus 
on terminology: some intend "ethics of self-fulfilment" also as "ethics of 
well-being" or as "eudaimonistic ethics", whereas others refer to "normative 
ethics" also as "ethics of moral obligation" or as "moral theory" in a strict 
sense. 
But what do these concepts mean exactly? They refer to two very different 
perspectives of the contemporary ethical search, which have two different 
points of departure and two different directions: ethics of self-fulfilment is 
above all concerned with the idea of a successful life, and is particularly 
interested in indicating the concepts of life and values on which this idea is 
grounded. This type of ethics also raises issues involving individual and 
social experience, history, memory, medical diagnostics and future-
prospects, with particular reference to social and individual recognition. 
Ethics of self-fulfilment questions whether the moral convictions on which 
our practical behaviour is grounded are plausible, consistent and 
compatible with our real possibilities. Particular values could be (at this 
level of everyday ethics) useful in situations of conflict as they might 
provide our conduct with continuity: and, of course, continuity is essential to 
us. Although this conduct might be readily shared by many individuals or 
groups and therefore develop a specific normative force, ethics of self-
fulfilment (intended as a theory of practical values and successful life) 
avoids judging whether these convictions and the ensuing behaviour are 
absolutely valid for everyone. That is, ethics of self-fulfilment analyses the 
beliefs of the agents, questions the traditional values, advises those who 
need advice (with reference to plausibility and consistency) in situations 
where a decision has to be taken, indicates possibilities which had been 
neglected or ignored by the agent. Its task is, to a certain extent, 
hermeneutic, i. e. ethics of self-fulfilment throws light on the aims and 
opportunities of the agent and at the same time guarantees him continuity. 
This kind of ethics does not have a prescriptive value, i. e. it is descriptive 
and indicative rather than normative (or at least, it has a limited normative 
force). For this reason ethics of self-fulfilment is not grounded, as on the 
contrary normative ethics is, on the categorical validity of moral judgements 
and rights: this type of ethics produces, in Kantian terms, hypothetical 
judgements whose normative character is naturally limited; the different 
options of actions are subordinated to the aims and ends which the agent 
considers essential. The ensuing duties are called, again as in Kant’s 
tradition, imperfect duties: they do not have a universal validity and 
therefore they are connected to the perfection of the action chosen to fulfil 
them. 
Normative ethics goes in a different direction. This ethics does not 
investigate the personal ideas and aims of the agent: it presupposes them. 
As ethics of self-fulfilment focuses on the agent’s interests and rights, 
normative ethics brings into play the interests and rights of others. If we 
hold that consideration of others is central to morality, this ethics can be 
regarded as "morality" in its higher sense. Its task is therefore to question 
the justification of actions and the grounds of the rights that are -or could 
be- assigned to agents: only the so called "legitimate" (i. e. justified) 
interests of others require a corresponding obligation. A stronger 
formulation of this concept can be traced in the theories of moral rights, 
whose duty is precisely that of making explicit and especially of giving the 
grounds for the fundamental rights (i. e. the rights which all humanbeings 
share). 
The duties outlined by normative ethics require a categorical validity and 
expect from all agents the respect of the rights of others, of those rights 
whose justification has been demonstrated. The main difficulty consists in 
the fact that this ethics must consider the rights of different individuals (not 
only those of one single agent) and therefore its task is also to find a 
satisfactory balance between these different interests. For this reason a 
theory of justice is an essential constitutive part of normative ethics. 
The two fundamental perspectives of ethics therefore hinge on choosing 
between an individual or a social direction. Not only is the coordination and 
ranking of ethics of self-fulfilment and normative ethics an open question 
with many different answers; even the evaluation of individual and social 
ethics can lead to a situation of conflict. The following framework, while 
providing us with a formal pattern for the two different fields, also 
demonstrates that they cannot be described one without the other. 
Framework 
This formal outline provides us with the object of ethics. In particular the 
different theories are compared point by point: this might, as I have already 
said, lead to problems of coordination. However, the four above mentioned 
dimensions give us the opportunity to propose a definition of ethics: 
Ethics is the theory of man’s self-fulfilment and duty. It questions the 
individual concept of life and social values: both are aspects of the 
individual/social aspiration to a successful life. Moreover, ethics throws light 
on the issue of rights: rights which are claimed by some and must be 
respected by others. Ethics also tries to find a way of balancing the 
interests and rights of different individuals and different groups. In this 
sense ethics calls upon those institutions and power-structures which are 
connected to the problem of rights. 
  
2. Analysis of the problem of pre-natal diagnostics 
-Questions of self-fulfilment ethics- 
Individual ethics/Social ethics 
Individual concepts of life/ social values "Decision making before/ after the 
discovery of an illness/ after the diagnosis: values, convictions, ideals 
(differences with the partner’s set of values). 
Possibilities of integration in the personal history "Attitude towards abortion" 
"Attitude towards risks" 
Quality of life and well—being: "Cultural concepts: pregnancy, birth" 
Concepts of human life "Shared social values (self—determination, 
autonomy, family, quality of life, health…)" 
Social attitude towards handicapped people and handicaps in general 
(normality vs. defect). 
- Normative—ethical questions -  
Justification of rights : "Rights of those involved (woman vs. baby?)" "right 
to self-determination" 
Abortion "The status of the fetus" 
Responsibility of doctors and advisers; criteria of advice (non directivity) 
"Individual eugenics? (Selection)": "Selection through lists of illnesses and 
screening?" "Criteria for advice and for medical conduct" 
Some aspects of social justice: sharing of costs in the health service (costs 
of pre-natal diagnostics in proportion to total cost) "Benefit payments" 
"right to integration, to education and to work?" Legitimation of commercial 
interests: "Socially legitimated eugenics" 
International aspects of pre-natal diagnostics. 
All these aspects outline problems which in the individual case are very 
hard to solve. However this brief framework might be of some help in 
illustrating, even if only temporarily, public opinion. This listing of problems 
opens a wide range of opportunities for individual evaluation and for 
practical conduct with reference to the issues of pre-natal diagnostics. This 
listing shows that the perspective of those involved is completely different 
both from that of professional advisers and of doctors and from that of 
society itself, as far as this personal perspective is accessible through 
media, literature on abortion and personal experience.  
The task of ethical theory is to coordinate the different aspects and, if 
possible, to rank them, therefore making possible a moral evaluation 
possible. 
  
3. Ethical evaluation 
3.1 Towards the concept of responsibility in ethics 
In the next part of my fragmentary ethical analysis I would like to clarify my 
personal approach. My point of departure will be the concept of 
responsibility. In my opinion this concept enables mediation between the 
two different levels (ethics of self-fulfilment/ normative ethics). It must be 
made clear that responsibility does not only regard others (or the rights of 
others) but also refers to ourselves, to our personal history, to our values, 
assets, aims… 
Aside from the normative dimension, responsibility can be defined as a 
(moral) attitude of care for oneself and for others, an attitude which might 
well be indicated as basic moral conduct. 
In no way does responsibility only refer to present choices and situations: 
its horizon is located in the past and in the future. If we intend responsibility 
in such a way, the historical dimension of agents is easier to understand: it 
is this very dimension which is able to create both norms and continuity in 
conduct. When I use the concept of responsibility as the possible mediation 
between the different ethical levels, I am asking myself (with reference to 
concrete situations) which agents (and institutions can be considered as 
agents) are responsible, towards whom and in what way. Although I will not 
avoid facing later the problem of responsibility in relation to duties (duties 
connected to the rights of others), I will however continue to use my own 
perspective in order to indicate the moral subjects who play an important 
role in the problem of pre-natal diagnostics. 
Notwithstanding the request to extend the debate to include a reflection on 
values both as regards the individual and socially, the moral-normative 
relationship towards the fetus is central to the discussion of pre-natal 
diagnostics. However my opinion is that, far too often, in ethical analysis 
two serious mistakes are made: firstly the highly moral request for 
protection is limited to the holders of moral rights; these are people who not 
only have interests but who are also capable of fulfilling their duties; what is 
therefore highlighted is the symmetrical relationship between individuals: 
the different requests of rights are handled and discussed with reference to 
this relation-ship. It is no wonder that the model for this type of relation is 
always the theory of social contract. At this point, however, a question 
naturally comes to mind: why should the prohibition to kill (intended as the 
negative right not to be killed) be valid also towards children who definitely 
are not moral subjects in the sense of "responsible agents"? What I mean 
is that the idea that the prohibition to kill is valid for indirect reasons (piety 
or reasons concerning the brutalisation of others) does not work as a 
description of concrete situations. The prohibition to kill, referred to 
children, clearly shows us that categorical duties exist also in non-
symmetrical relation-ships: these duties directly stem from the need for 
protection, they do not stem indirectly from the status of the other 
individual, from his being a bearer of rights. In non-symmetrical 
relationships duties and rights do not converge. 
The second mistake is to make use of a reductive concept of personhood 
as a basis of the ethical analysis, a concept in which the anthropological 
link of body and soul is lost: in Gewirth and Steigleder for example the 
capacity of action and of moral thinking is the basis for the allocation of 
rights. This terminology, however, is not clear and precise. The origin of the 
capacity of action, for example, is not thoroughly considered. The whole 
question of "passive rights" or, in more moderate terms, of "passive 
protection" remains unanswered: and this is something which cannot be 
ignored nor underestimated. In Gewirth’s and Steigleder’s theory of human 
personality the central point for the acknowledgement of rights is 
exclusively the capacity to develop autonomously personal aims. But aren’t 
other aspects of personality —for example the corporal and temporal 
contexts, the need for social recognition for the development of personality- 
also of normative relevance? And couldn’t these aspects overcome the 
weak points of a unilateral vision of personality and therefore enable an 
understanding of the fundamental (or imperfect) duties? In this sense the 
concept of personhood is important both to determine the agent’s rights —
and with reference to the pre-natal diagnostics of the embryo’s rights- and 
to clarify of the so called subject of responsibility. The rights’ issue is part of 
the wider context of the responsibility which a person has towards another 
person. Responsibility is not, for the supporters of a "moral theory" in its 
strictest sense, exclusively related to people, but also to animals, the 
environment and so on. 
The analyses of rights must however supply us with some practical criteria 
useful in the search for a balance in those situations of conflict where two 
or more rights are to be considered. In principle (i. e. apart from the ever 
tragic situation of conflict) human beings have a generic responsibility to 
protect of embryos and fetuses, whatever individual characteristics they 
might have. In the field of pre-natal diagnostics there definitely is what we 
have called a conflict of rights. Can the change of perspective I have so far 
adopted to explain the concept of responsibility be of some help? In my 
opinion it can. 
  
3.2 Responsible parents and pre-natal diagnostics 
The social changes which have affected the concept of parenthood do not 
leave the idea of responsibility undisturbed: it must be made clear whether 
donors of sperm and eggs are responsible for their children as "genetic 
parents" or if, once they have given their contribution, they leave the scene. 
Moreover, it must be made clear whether the State or other institutions 
should request, before marriage, genetic tests in order to show the pre-
disposal for certain illnesses. 
This is not the place to develop a wide vision of responsible parenthood 
under the circumstances of pre-natal diagnostics. It must be however 
considered that most of the invasive diagnostic techniques are carried out 
for reasons of age. These pregnancies are usually planned and strongly 
desired. The moral conflict is provoked however by the diagnostic 
discovery of a health problem in the child. By "pre-natal" diagnostics we 
intend the chromosomic and genetic analysis of the hereditary 
characteristics of the baby, analysis which still has to be clinically 
discussed, for it does not allow a precise prognosis of the illness. There is 
clearly, for the rest of the pregnancy, an evident psychological (more than 
physical) burden for the woman, a burden related both to the incomplete 
information given by the diagnosis and to the shattering of the ideal vision 
of the baby. Essentially what is damaged is an expected condition which 
will take place only after the birth, and this however must not be 
underestimated. The question is whether women, couples or parents have 
an adequate comprehension of parenthood when they know, before the 
pregnancy, that they will terminate it should a pre-natal diagnosis discover 
an illness. This can be considered as the first case of responsibility. Before 
the introduction of pre-natal diagnostics couples had to ask themselves 
whether they would eventually have been prepared to take care of a 
handicapped or sick child, and in many cases those couples with a 
hereditary problem or in an advanced age decided not to have children. 
Pre-natal diagnostics has shifted the problem in the direction of the tests 
and of abortion in these circumstances. Nowadays we must ask ourselves 
whether parents can make a request for quality — and health certainly is 
such a request — into a condition for the acceptance of their child. My 
opinion is that parents owe this to their children, especially if we think of the 
importance of social recognition: the idea of a generic responsibility 
towards human life is not entwined with an adequate concept of 
parenthood. 
In many cases we do not have the possibility to chose whether or not we 
want to take responsibility: we are responsible, without having asked for it, 
for example towards our family and our loved ones. With conscious 
procreation couples enter the circle of parents as free agents: they are 
responsible for their children until they become autonomous. However, 
even in the best social and ethical conditions we will have situations in 
which women or couples, who initially wanted to have children, eventually 
decide they can not take that responsibility. The juridical formulation of this 
situation is somehow implicitly given in German Law (218a). Moral 
judgement must however wait for the final decision of the woman, she 
alone can decide what limits her capacity for responsibility has. In ethical 
terms, prescription of duty presupposes practical capacity. In the absence 
of conditions for taking responsibility, the requirement of duty, although 
valid in itself, is not practically feasible. Hence it is necessary, when 
advising an expectant mother, to explain the problem of responsibility 
before the pre-natal diagnosis: a specific+ training of the advisers is 
therefore needed. Not only the juridical formulation but also the ethical 
opinion leaves open a grey area of action, which must be classified as a 
particular case of individual choice. 
3.3 Responsibility of the doctor in pre-natal diagnostics 
The relationship doctor-patient can be considered in two ways. Doctors and 
clinical staff are not only responsible for assisting the pregnant woman as a 
patient; they also have to assist the embryo or the fetus. The fetus is 
certainly protected by the mother from any external intervention; however 
the relationship of the woman towards the doctor is fragile, especially if it is 
a question of the baby’s health; moreover the technical developments of 
the last decade have increased the doctor's possibility of action and 
accordingly a reconsideration of the doctor's responsibility is necessary. 
His responsibility does not only lie in the decision to practise an abortion. It 
also lies in choosing to accept the risk of a miscarriage due to the use of 
invasive diagnostic techniques. Up to now this field has been regarded as 
an ethical taboo. For this very reason the role and importance of advice 
before diagnosis is often neglected: the future mother finds herself in a 
situation which she has never really thought about and has to take a 
decision without having enough professional advice. 
The relationship doctor-patient is always understood to follow the model of 
gynaecology and assistance to expectant mothers. Let's consider however 
the context of medically advised abortion: its model has its limits and 
indeed overlaps with that of neonatology and pediatrics. In this latter model 
the parents' autonomy is strongly limited by the baby's right to protection. In 
situations of conflict doctors very often decide against the parents' interest, 
as far as the baby's life and well-being are concerned. There is a subtle 
transition from the model of gynaecology to that of pediatrics. At the 
beginning of the pregnancy the assistance to the mother is in the 
foreground, in accordance with her autonomy. Towards the end, however, 
the fetus gains more and more importance. My opinion is that at this point 
professional self reflection is needed, in order to identify the doctor's 
specific responsibility, with reference to the pregnant woman, with 
reference to the relationship towards a terminally ill fetus, whose illness can 
be traced before birth, with reference to the pre-natal killing of fetuses who 
would live, with reference to the relationship towards living infants after an 
abortion. 
Moreover, it will be a specific task of the professional orders to organize 
training courses so as to give doctors, social assistants and obstetricians 
the capacity to handle a situation of conflict in the best way. In these 
courses a fundamental role should be played by the psychological 
(treatment of psychological traumas), social (unlimited recognition of 
handicapped/sick individuals as a required value for a supportive society) 
and ethical aspects. 
3.4 Social responsibility in pre-natal diagnostics 
I can not thoroughly explain in this paper the social and ethical 
consequences of a policy of social recognition of man’s early life; I will not 
however dissimulate that I firmly criticise the trend of the past years, that 
has lead —in the field of pre-natal diagnostics- to a praxis of "bottom-up 
eugenics" , that is to an individualistic and voluntary eugenic behaviour, 
grounded however on a form of "voluntary constraint". When exception 
becomes the rule the social sense of responsibility fades. Significant 
changes of values should always be followed, step by step, by an ethics of 
self-fulfilment. When solidarity seems at risk, it is duty of the different 
institutions involved to ensure social recognition. This is not only valid for 
the public health service, for the medical and non-medical insurances and 
for the whole health system, but it is also valid for the instruction system 
and for mass-medias, which in particular lead the transmission of values. 
The moral culture of a society, and not exclusively its "contingent" national 
Law, has the specific task of welcoming its members and of providing them 
with an adequate social place. The occidental societies as yet have not 
developed such a conduct, and very often too much is asked of us as 
single individuals. Gynaecological associations, clinics, rehabilitation 
centres, medical insurances, nursery schools, schools and even companies 
are institutions and must recognise —in different ways- handicapped 
children and adults. One possible form of recognition consists in the stabile 
organization of advice and support groups for the therapeutic assistance of 
woman and couples. Doctors themselves must respect the responsibility 
deriving from the changed relationship towards both their patients. With the 
increase of genetic tests this issue is extremely urgent. 
Our society will have to prove —in the years to come- whether the shared 
values which have grounded our attitude towards handicapped people from 
the second world war on will be valid also for the next century. Faced with 
the new medical developments and with the continuous erosion of society 
such a reflection is essential. 
The relationship towards children mirrors the vision a society has of the 
relationship towards those who need assistance. Medically assisted 
procreation belongs to this context: when the limited acceptance of a child 
—which in normative sense I interpret as limited respect- is decided from 
the moment of the procreation or at the very beginning of the pregnancy 
then not only is the baby’s protection weakened: also the acceptance of 
"deviation" from the so called "normality" is at risk. The acknowledgement 
that normality in itself is plural and therefore allows difference and diversity 
will not be easy to achieve. In ethical terms this shows on one hand the 
extreme fragile nature of the concept of recognition in our society, and on 
the other it demonstrates that the recognition of the "special" and particular 
nature of each of us is a constitutive part of the idea of man’s continuous 
development and therefore is the other side of normative equality.  
  
  
